



S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20330918

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

18 September 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000928DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S//NF) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Khi Ali Gul
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Khi Ali Gul, Muktar Gul
- Place of Birth: Yaqubi Village, Kubay District, Khowst Province, Afghanistan (AF)
- Date of Birth: 1963
- Citizenship: Afghanistan
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9AF-000928DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall fair health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously assessed detainee as CD on 15 April 2007.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: *If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would immediately seek out prior associates and reengage in hostilities and extremist support activities. Since detainee's transfer to JTF-GTMO, detainee's brother has engaged in insurgent operations with the Haqqani Network in Afghanistan, greatly increasing detainee's probability for recidivism once released. Additionally, detainee has withheld information of intelligence value and participated in mass disturbances*

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20330918

S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20330918

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000928DP (S)

demonstrating a continuing support to extremist activities. Detainee is assessed to be a member of an Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) group named Union of Mujahideen (UOM)¹ with indirect ties to the Haqqani Network.² Prior to detention, detainee was previously a commander in the Gorbaz Mehdi Jihadi Battalion³. Detainee planned and executed attacks against US and Coalition forces with the UOM. Detainee acted as an intelligence officer, gathered information, and created a list of Afghans helping US and Coalition forces in order to engage them. Detainee was an intelligence officer for the Taliban and reportedly an agent for the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID). JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **LOW** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **MEDIUM** intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Updated detainee's account of events

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee maintains he has never attended school of any kind and does not know how to read or write. During the Soviet-Afghan War, detainee took his family to the Northwest frontier territory of Pakistan (PK) and they did not return to Yakubi

¹ IIR 6 044 0002 03, Analyst Note: The UOM is believed to be an alliance between former Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) personnel who operate in the area of Khowst, AF.

² DIA Human Factors Assessment- The Jalaladin Haqqani Network: The Jalaladin Haqqani Network (HqN), is a Zadran Pashtun tribal leader and a former Minister of Frontier and Tribal Affairs of the Taliban regime. While he associates with Mullah Mohammad Omar and Osama bin Laden, Haqqani is influential in his own right. As a young man, Haqqani was a teacher of Islam. His philosophy resonated with many, and earned him a number of followers. When the Afghan Communist Party seized power in 1974, Haqqani's followers turned to him for guidance. He eventually became a military commander, and has remained on the battlefield since. He developed his authority through religious preaching and battlefield successes over the course of 20 years. Since the fall of the Taliban regime, Haqqani has continued to direct attacks against Coalition forces from the sanctuary of the tribal areas on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border; TD-314/76851-07.

³ IIR 6 044 0456 03, Analyst Note: The Gorbaz Medhi Battalion only lasted 45 days under the Karzai administration before Afghan President Karzai stood the battalion down citing financial concerns.

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000928DP (S)

until 1989. Detainee claims he fought the Soviets from 1984 to 1989 under the command of Islam Gul.⁴

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: After detainee returned to Afghanistan (AF), he mainly worked on his family's farm growing wheat, rice, and corn. Detainee and his brother, Bayar Gul, bought a diesel gas station. Detainee and eight others were hired by Hazarat Uddin⁵ to be security guards for the government intelligence office in Khowst, AF. Detainee stated they did not get paid for five months, so he used his own money to pay for his men's personal items. Uddin told detainee he would be reimbursed for his expenses, but detainee claimed he never received compensation and is still owed over 10,000 rupees.⁶ Detainee claimed Uddin was a businessman who frequently visited Dubai, United Arab Emirates (AE).⁷

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee's work included transporting documents between Khowst and Kabul, AF for Uddin. Detainee also operated as an informant for the chief of the Khowst intelligence office, Uddin. Detainee would travel around Khowst and acquire information on local tribal disputes and report back to Uddin. Detainee also drove people around the city of Khowst. Detainee denied he ever worked for the Taliban or had any contact with them. Detainee claims the reason he did not fight is because his tribe collected money and paid the Taliban so they did not have to fight for the Taliban.⁸

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) Detainee was captured while riding in a minibus to the Khowst bazaar at an Afghan Military Forces (AMF) checkpoint on 24 December 2002. Detainee claims two of his enemies who were working a checkpoint near the US Forward Operating Base (FOB) Salerno arrested him.⁹ Detainee was transferred to the custody of US forces on 24 December 2002.

b. (S) Property Held:

- 5 Pakistani Rupees (PKR)¹⁰

⁴ 000928 302 24-MAR-2003, Analyst Note: The Soviet-Afghan war took place during the period of 1979 until the first part of 1989.

⁵ Analyst Note: Hazarat Uddin is the former head of Afghan Intelligence in Khowst and now is a minister in Kabul, AF.

⁶ Analyst Note: Equivalent to \$182 US

⁷ 000928 302 24-MAR-2003, 000928 MFR 23-MAR-2003

⁸ 000928 MFR 23-MAR-2003, 000928 302 24-MAR-2003

⁹ 000928 MFR 24-MAR-2003, 000928 MFR 23-MAR-2003

¹⁰ Analyst Note: Approximately \$.09 US

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000928DP (S)

- 2 x ID cards
- Miscellaneous items including prayer beads, calculator, scissors, gown, match box, band-aid, razor blades, ball point pen, empty pill packet of Oradexon, and a comb

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 23 March 2003

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Jihadi Brigade for the Afghan Central Government in the province of Gardez, AF
- National Directorate of Security (NDS) office in Khowst

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee's story is not completely accurate. Detainee admitted he would lie to debriefers to prevent them from asking him too many questions.¹¹ Detainee has denied he worked for the Taliban, ISID, or Jalaluddin Haqqani. However, sources report detainee worked for or has indirect ties to all three of these entities. Detainee planned and executed an attack on a US and Coalition FOB, but claims to be glad Americans are in his country.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: *If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would immediately seek out prior associates and reengage in hostilities and extremist support activities. Since transfer to JTF-GTMO, detainee has withheld information of intelligence value and participated in mass disturbances demonstrating a continuing support to extremist activities.* Detainee is assessed to be a member and possibly a leader of the UOM, an ACM group that conducted an attack on US forces and which has ties to the Haqqani Network. Prior to detention, detainee was an intelligence officer for the Taliban and reportedly an agent for the ISID.

- (S//NF) Detainee was a member and probable leader of an ACM group that conducted an attack against US forces.

¹¹ 000928 MFR 24-MAR-2003

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000928DP (S)

- (S//NF) On 1 December 2002, detainee and several other Afghans met at his house to plan and execute a rocket attack against FOB Salerno. Later that day, six rockets were fired at FOB Salerno.¹²
 - (S//NF) Analyst Note: Due to the location of the planning (detainee's house), detainee's former position as an intelligence officer for the Gorbaz Mehdi Jihadi Battalion, and his position in the Taliban intelligence department, detainee is assessed to be the leader of the UOM terrorist cell in the Khowst area.¹³
- (S//NF) The following individuals are believed to be UOM members who were present at detainee's house during the planning of the attack on FOB Salerno: Abas Khan, Faizel Gul aka (Faizullah Khan), Khyal Manghal, Bakht Jamal, Haji Sherin, Gazi Manghal, Sergeant Major Afzal, Security Commander Muhammad Yousuf, and Ajab Khan or Ajab Gi.¹⁴
 - (S//NF) Detainee is associated with Abas Khan through both the ACM attack cell of the UOM and the Gorbaz Medhi Battalion.¹⁵ Khan is reportedly a current member of General Ludin's Jihadi Battalion along with Khyal Manghal and Gazi Manghal as noted previously.¹⁶
 - (S//NF) Detainee's brother, Shahzad Gul aka (Shah Hazad), is a member of the HIG and an important member of Khan's command structure.¹⁷
 - ◆ (S//NF) On 16 July 2004, an individual was detained and beaten by Yaqobi District governor, Akbar, because of his cooperation with US forces. Jamil (NFI), who was an intelligence officer for Jalaludin Haqqani during the Taliban government, told Akbar about the individual's cooperation. Jamil was in Akbar's office frequently. During the beating, Akbar advised that he should not be helping the Americans if he wants to continue living. Shah Hazad had a relationship with Jamil. Jamal and Hazad were paid by the Pakistani government and Hazad was an important person in Abas Khan's command structure. Additionally, Hazad is the brother of detainee at JTF-GTMO.¹⁸

¹² IIR 6 044 0556 03

¹³ IIR 6 044 0002 03

¹⁴ IIR 6 044 0556 03, IIR 6 044 0456 03, IIR 6 044 0002 03, IIR 6 044 0483 03, Analyst Note: Abas Khan is a HIG member and a Gorbaz Medhi commander and Manghal is a leader in the Gorbaz Mehdi Battalion and Union of the Mujahdeen (UOM) member. The HIG is a National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) Priority 2 counter terrorism (CT) target. NIPF Priority 2 CT targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the Combatant Commanders or DNI EXCOM Principals, not already identified as Priority 1. This includes terrorist groups, especially those with state support, countries that sponsor terrorism or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack US persons or interests.

¹⁵ IIR 6 044 0556 03, IIR 6 044 0456 03

¹⁶ IIR 6 044 0483 03

¹⁷ IIR 6 044 2110 04

¹⁸ IIR 6 044 2110 04

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000928DP (S)

(Analyst Note: Indicates that detainee would probably return to hostilities if rejoined with family.)

- (S//NF) Khan had specific instructions from Jalaluddin Haqqani to harm Afghans who were found in possession of voter registration cards. There were several members of the Afghan community who were bombed or attacked by Khan.¹⁹
- (S//NF) Khan had ties to Jalaluddin Haqqani and regularly met with Hazarat Uddin, the commander of the NDS office in Khowst, as well as detainee's commander. Haqqani provided Khan with fifteen fighters to patrol the mountainous areas in the Sobarai and Bak districts of the Khowst province.²⁰
- (S//NF) Detainee provided assistance to Khan in his campaign.²¹
- (S//NF) Gul Rahman provided a truck, previously owned by an al-Qaida member, used to carry the rockets and launcher for the attack.²²
 - ◆ (S//NF) During the execution phase of the attack on FOB Salerno, the group placed the rocket launcher on hay, which subsequently caught fire during the launch of the rockets. The truck caught on fire and was destroyed.²³
- (S//NF) The UOM is also responsible for the bombing of a TV and VCR store in Khowst, to discourage people from buying the appliances in conjunction with the UOM's anti western and anti-US position.²⁴
- (S//NF) Detainee reportedly served as an intelligence chief under the Taliban regime during which he harassed and assassinated Afghan intellectuals.²⁵ (Analyst Note: Through detainee's position as intelligence chief under the Taliban regime and as a commander of the Gorbaz Mehdi Jihadi Battalion, detainee probably has information concerning Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sarajuddin.)
- (S//NF) Detainee was previously a commander in the Gorbaz Mehdi Jihadi Battalion under the overall command of Khyal Manghal.²⁶
 - (S//NF) As the intelligence officer for the Gorbaz Mehdi Jihadi Battalion, detainee routinely collected information on Afghans who helped US and Coalition forces.²⁷ Detainee became a member of the Gorbaz Mehdi Jihadi Battalion after the disbanding of the UOM.²⁸

¹⁹ TD 314/47130-04

²⁰ IIR 6 059 1304 06, TD 314 47130-04

²¹ TD 314 47130-04

²² IIR 6 044 0556 03

²³ IIR 6 044 0565 03

²⁴ IIR 6 044 0483 03

²⁵ IIR 6 044 0565 03

²⁶ IIR 6 044 0575 03

²⁷ IIR 6 044 0565 03

²⁸ IIR 6 044 0483 03

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000928DP (S)

- (S//NF) Many members of the Gorbaz Mehdi Jihadi Battalion have ties to known Taliban and/or al-Qaida personnel, including Mulawi Lowar, a former Taliban director of justice and an officer in the religious police (Analyst Note: This note on religious police is probably in reference to the vice and virtue police). Bakht Mal Jan was a fugitive involved with the finances of Jalaluddin Haqqani and detainee's noted associate Abas Khan, who additionally had ties to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, was founder of the HIG.²⁹
- (S//NF) Detainee is an associate of Mohammad Nabi Omari, ISN US9AF-00832DP (AF-832). AF-832 possessed a weapons cache in the village of Sobarai, near Khowst. AF-832 was a member of the Taliban in Khowst when the Taliban were in power.³⁰
- (S//NF) An Afghan military officer reported that detainee was an agent for the ISID of Pakistan, and had recruited sources for the ISID.³¹
- (S//NF) Detainee's brother remains active in ACM activity.

c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a **LOW** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been compliant and non hostile to the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 14 reports of disciplinary infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 28 October 2007, when he was found in possession of contraband. He has no reports of disciplinary infraction for assault. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions and camp rules, unauthorized communications and damage to government property. In 2007, detainee had a total of five Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and none so far in 2008.

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **MEDIUM** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 15 August 2008.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee was a commander in the Gorbaz Mehdi Battalion. Detainee was reportedly an intelligence chief under the Taliban regime. Due to detainee's unique placement in the UOM, which is an ACM group, detainee should have knowledge, although dated, concerning the UOM or ACM training, funding, and operational planning. Detainee reportedly worked and recruited for the ISID.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee may have information regarding significant ACM operatives to include Jalaluddin Haqqani and Haqqani's son Sarajuddin. Some

²⁹ IIR 6 044 0456 03, IIR 6 044 0567 03

³⁰ IIR 6 044 0575 03

³¹ IIR 6 044 0565 03

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000928DP (S)

members in detainee's cell were also members of the HIG. Detainee may have knowledge on the HIG. Detainee probably possesses information regarding the methods of funding for UOM and Haqqani. Information regarding detainee's employment with the ISID is limited. However, if accurate, further exploitation of this association may yield information to determine ISID's attempts to undermine and interfere with internal Afghan affairs.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Union of Mujahideen
 - Personnel
 - *Madrasahs* (religious schools) used by UOM
 - Funding for UOM
- Jalaluddin Haqqani
- Personnel
 - Safe houses used by Haqqani
 - Weapons caches
 - Members in the Afghan government.
- Intelligence
 - Taliban
 - Assistance to Abas Khan against US and Coalition supporters
 - ISID

9. (S) **EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 27 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.



D. M. THOMAS, JR
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.